Western New England University School of Law

Digital Commons @ Western New England University School of
Law
Media Presence

Faculty Publications

10-22-2014

Blackwater Guilty Verdict Long Overdue
Lauren Carasik
Western New England University School of Law, lcarasik@law.wne.edu

Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.law.wne.edu/media
Part of the Human Rights Law Commons
Recommended Citation
Lauren Carasik, Blackwater Guilty Verdict Long Overdue, ALJAZEERA AMERICA (Oct. 22, 2014), http://america.aljazeera.com/
opinions/2014/10/blackwater-guiltyverdictforiraqsnisoursquareshootings.html

This Editorial is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty Publications at Digital Commons @ Western New England University School of
Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in Media Presence by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons @ Western New England University
School of Law. For more information, please contact pnewcombe@law.wne.edu.

Blackwater guilty verdict long overdue
Despite convictions, accountability gaps remain for security contractors
October 22, 2014 1:30AM ET

by Lauren Carasik @LCarasik

Seven years after Blackwater contractors killed 14 unarmed Iraqi civilians and
injured 17 others in Baghdad’s Nisour Square, a federal jury in the District of
Columbia convicted one defendant of murder and three others of
manslaughter and weapons charges for the bloodbath. The verdict was
announced on Wednesday after 27 days of deliberation.
The trial, which began June 11, served as an important test of U.S. willingness to
hold its contractors to account. Blackwater was hired by the State Department to
provide security for diplomats in Iraq. The carnage served as a flashpoint for Iraqi
anger at Blackwater and sparked an international debate about the use of private
security contractors.
Iraqis’ demands for justice have been somewhat muted recently by their need for
assistance in combating the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL). But it is
precisely the specter of increased U.S. engagement in Iraq and reluctance to put
American military boots back on the ground that makes the gaps in accountability
all the more urgent to fill. However, it is not simply the individual guards who
should answer for this tragedy: Leaders of private security companies and the
governments that employ them must also be held to account.

Recklessness and hubris
Most of the facts in this case are uncontested. On Sept. 16, 2007, the guards,
positioned in four armored trucks, drove into Nisour Square. There they opened
fire at a white Kia sedan driven by an unarmed Iraqi medical student and his
mother, killing 17 unarmed Iraqi civilians. While the guards claim they believed
they were being ambushed, there is little evidence to support their belief.

The first of more than 60 witnesses to testify during the trial was Mohammed
Kinani, whose 9-year-old son, Ali Abdul Razzaq, was killed as he sat in the
backseat of his family’s car. Kinani recounted that day in harrowing detail. When
the staccato of gunfire finally stopped, Kinani found his youngest son slumped
sideways as his brains spilled to the ground between his shoes. After Ali died en
route to the hospital, Kinani returned to the bloody scene to gather the rest of his
son’s skull and brain tissue for burial. At one point during his testimony, Kinani
was so grief-stricken that Judge Royce C. Lamberth recessed the trial until he
could compose himself. The day after Kinani’s wrenching testimony, Lamberth
excused a juror who said she was too haunted by Kinani’s story to sleep.
Blackwater’s recklessness and hubris incited outrage among Iraqi civilians and
the government. Appearing at a congressional hearing in 2007, Erik Prince, the
company’s founder and former CEO, testified that his men “acted appropriately at
all times.” But his assertions were belied by the company’s questionable tactics
to defend its reputation and fend off threats to its ongoing business in Iraq.
Former company officials claimed that in December 2007, Blackwater approved
secret payments of $1 million to Iraqi officials, hoping to defuse criticism and
evade accountability for the Nisour Square killings. Such payments are illegal
under the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, which prohibits bribing foreign officials.

The verdict against the Blackwater guards is a small and
laudable step toward ending impunity. But the US must develop
mechanisms to ensure accountability that ascends the chain of
command in both private companies and the governments that
hire them.
Blackwater’s reputation was badly tarnished well before the Nisour Square
tragedy. The New York Times wrote that “Blackwater had cultivated a cowboy
culture that was contemptuous of government rules and regulations,” according
to former company officials. Yet U.S. officials turned a blind eye to its misdeeds.
A State Department investigation into Blackwater operations in Iraq was abruptly

stopped in August, a few weeks prior to the shootings at Nisour Square. In
a memo to officials on Aug. 31, chief investigator Jean Richter reported,
“Blackwater contractors saw themselves as above the law.” He described a
systematic lack of professionalism and discipline, compounded by superficial
oversight of the contractors that created the perception that Blackwater issued
rather than followed commands of the military. Richter reported that Daniel
Carroll, Blackwater’s leader in Iraq, mentioned menacingly that “he could kill”
him. But Richter’s warnings went unheeded. Despite its well-known misconduct,
Blackwater was still able to obtain lucrative contracts in 2010 by designing a web
of shell companies and subsidiary corporations.
Prince sold the company, now known as Academi, four years ago. According to
documents obtained by WikiLeaks, Prince had won $1.6 billion in unclassified
federal contracts for the company in addition to payment for conducting classified
work for the Central Intelligence Agency. And that is only a fraction of U.S.
government expenditures for the security-industrial complex in the last seven
years. The Department of Defense alone spent $160 billion on private security in
Iraq and Afghanistan from 2007 to 2012. At various points, private contractors
outnumbered military personnel in Iraq.

Oversight and accountability
The lesson of the Nisour Square shootings is that privatizing military functions is
inherently risky. For one, employees owe their allegiance to the firm, not the U.S.
or the military policies it espouses. Despite their increased presence in
conflicts and numerous instances of abuse, there are gaping holes in the civil
and criminal accountability framework at the domestic and international levels.
The Military Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Act (MEJA), used to charge the
Blackwater defendants, applies to Department of Defense missions and covers
other U.S. agencies only “to the extent such employment relates to supporting
the mission of the Department of Defense overseas.” But many
perpetrators escape accountability for abuses, in part because of Washington’s
reluctance to prosecute crimes. In July, Sen. Patrick Leahy, D-Vt., continued his

effort to expand liability by reintroducing the Civilian Extraterritorial Jurisdiction
Act. The bill would extend the reach of criminal responsibility to those working for
other U.S. agencies and require the administration to adequately resource efforts
to investigate violations. But so far, Leahy’s efforts have been unsuccessful.
Efforts are underway to fix the accountability gap at the international level as
well, largely focused on industry self-regulation. In 2010 the International Code of
Conduct for Private Security Service Providers (ICOC) established standards that
comport with human rights and humanitarian principles. The initiative relies on
independent oversight to ensure compliance through a certification and
monitoring process as well as a complaint mechanism. As of September
2013, more than 700 companies have signed on to the standards. Critics note
the ICOC is an agreement brokered by competing interests, including contractors
arguing for the lowest standards and civil society advocates demanding more
stringent safeguards, and that it is nonbinding and does not provide for remedies
for the aggrieved. Nevertheless, the U.S. should contract only with companies
that comply with the ICOC, to reinforce a normative framework of responsibility
and encourage industrywide buy-in.
But nonbinding initiatives are not enough. In 2010 the United Nations
Mercenaries Working Group proposed a new convention more suitable for
modern warfare and conflict zones. The treaty would explicitly cover private
military and security contractors, promote transparency and accountability and
ensure remedies for victims of grave human rights violations. Many countries
support a legally binding international framework, but the lack of consensus on
the need for a treaty dampens the likelihood of its adoption. Unsurprisingly,
countries such as the U.S. that employ and are home to many of the private
security companies are the most vocal opponents.
The U.S. resists labeling its private military contractors mercenaries. But
Washington is increasingly relying on paid private gunmen to provide critical
services on the battleground and elsewhere, where the risk of lethal errors and
the consequences of misconduct are high. Without clear laws, private soldiers

will continue to operate in a legal vacuum. The verdict against the Blackwater
guards is a small and laudable step toward ending impunity. But the U.S. must
develop mechanisms to ensure accountability that ascends the chain of
command in both private companies and the governments that hire them.
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